5. Compensation components and system
5.1 Overview of compensation components
5.1 Overview of compensation components
The table below provides an overview of the compensation components for the Board of Directors and the Management Board, with more details on both included later in the report:
5.2 Board of Directors compensation system
5.2 Board of Directors compensation system
Role, responsibility and commitment
Sonova needs to be able to attract and retain members of the Board of Directors who are highly experienced and motivated to contribute their specific business expertise and perform a critical role in the strategic oversight of the company. Their compensation must enable this, while taking account of the way their contribution to Sonovaʼs success differs from that of the members of the Management Board.
Requirements – in terms of qualifications, skills, and experience – for directors of international listed companies are becoming ever more stringent. Sonovaʼs Board of Directors has the relevant and necessary skill set to ensure proper professional supervision, including international, industry, and subject specific experience.
The compensation structure reflects varying responsibilities, committee memberships, workloads and time commitments, so individual compensation levels are not the same. The Chair of the Board of Directors, for example, devotes a substantial amount of his time to mandated duties, including leading the Board of Directors, coordinating Board and committee meeting agendas and topics with committee chairs, and contributing to and participating in committee meetings as guest.
The Chair of the Board of Directors is also responsible for the continued development and adaptation of Sonovaʼs governance to meet regulatory and corporate requirements, preparing for and conducting the AGM, and overseeing the annual report, as well as advising the CEO on key strategic, financial, HR, and operational matters. His role also encompasses third party interactions such as shareholder inquiries and requests about corporate governance and corporate responsibility as well as meetings with proxy advisors. His sound understanding of the company, developed over many years of service, is a unique and valuable qualification that we believe provides a substantial benefit to Sonova and its shareholders.
More details on the Board of Directorsʼ composition, diversity, competencies, evaluation, risk and compliance management, as well as corporate responsibility, can be found in the corporate governance report.
It is important that compensation components are structured to create a strong alignment with the interests of our shareholders. In line with best practice, a significant portion of the compensation of the Board of Directors consists of restricted shares; members of the Board of Directors receive no variable or performance-based compensation and are not eligible to participate in the occupational pension plan.
The compensation of members of the Board of Directors is defined in a regulation adopted by the Board of Directors. It consists of fixed compensation: a cash retainer and shares with a restriction period of five years and four months (Chair of the Board of Directors) or four years and four months (all other members). In addition, members of the Board of Directors receive committee fees (if applicable) and, until the 2022 AGM, a travel allowance.
Compensation structure 2021 AGM to 2022 AGM
The compensation of members of the Board of Directors is subject to mandatory employer social security contributions (AHV/ALV). These contributions are paid by Sonova and are disclosed in the compensation report in compliance with Sonovaʼs reporting obligations.
Sonova does not grant contractual severance payments to members of the Board of Directors, nor does Sonova make advance payments or grant loans to them.
Sonova Share Ownership Guidelines
To further align the interests of the Board of Directors with those of our shareholders, the Sonova share ownership guidelines require the members to hold a fixed value in shares.
Members of the Board of Directors are required to maintain a minimum shareholding equivalent to CHF 200,000. They have five months from the first grant of restricted shares to achieve 80% of the required shareholdings, and one year and five months from the same point in time to achieve the full required shareholdings. The requirements of the guidelines can be met through shareholdings in the form of the restricted shares awarded as part of compensation and, if applicable, through share purchases on the open market. Compliance with the shareholding requirement is reviewed annually by the NCC.
5.3 Management Board compensation system
5.3 Management Board compensation system
As outlined in the introduction to this compensation report, the compensation system of the Management Board is linked to the companyʼs strategy and business results, and aligns with the interests of our shareholders, rewarding performance in the context of the business and the market. This compensation system has proven to be effective over several years.
The compensation of the Management Board (including the CEO) is defined in several regulations adopted by the Board of Directors and comprises:
- A fixed base salary;
- A short-term cash incentive award (VCC);
- A long-term equity incentive award (EEAP); and
- Employee benefits, such as pension benefits, flat rate cash car allowance, expense allowance, relocation benefits for certain affected members, as well as social security contributions.
The charts below illustrate the compensation mix excluding employee benefits at target for the CEO, Arnd Kaldowski, and the Management Board in the 2021/22 financial year:
The table below provides an overview of the compensation components of the Management Board, with more details on the following pages. The ratio of the VCC and the EEAP as a percentage of the fixed base salary shown in the table on the next page can vary slightly year-on-year, depending on which component (if any) is adjusted as a result of the compensation review.
Compensation structure 2021/22 financial year
Fixed base salary
The fixed base salary ensures a recurrent payment in cash in regular instalments. The salary level is based on the scope and complexity of the position, market norms and benchmarks, and the individualʼs profile in terms of experience and skills. Salary progression depends primarily on the individualʼs performance, as well as on market developments and the economic environment.
Short-term cash incentive award (Variable Cash Compensation)
Sonovaʼs VCC aims at aligning a significant part of compensation to budget achievements in a given financial year. The VCC is an integral component of the compensation for members of the Management Board, defined as a percentage of the annual fixed base salary. At target, it amounts to 89% of fixed base salary for the CEO and to 50% for the other members of the Management Board.
The Board of Directors normally determines the target performance level for each key performance indicator (KPI) annually for the following financial year, based on the recommendation of the NCC. The targets are generally set in such a way that on an adjusted base, substantial improvements from the previous financial yearʼs achievement are required, in line with the companyʼs ambitious mid- and long-term financial plans. Setting demanding and ambitious targets helps Sonova strive to deliver best-in-class performance and stay ahead of the market. Lower and upper performance thresholds are also set, below which the payout percentage is zero, and above which it is capped at 200%, with the exception of sales at 250% and certain ESG targets at 100%. Payout levels between the threshold, the target, and the maximum are calculated by linear interpolation.
The VCC for the Management Board is based on four categories of performance objectives: Group and/or business unit financials, ESG performance, and individual performance objectives.
Group performance objectives are based on the budget; the specific KPIs can include sales, EBITA, FCF, and EPS. Business unit performance objectives can include sales, EBITA, OPEX, ASP, and margin of the respective business unit. These KPIs have been chosen because they are the key drivers for the long-term success of Sonova; they reward for expanding the business, gaining market share, and further increasing profitability through operating leverage.
In broad terms, the rationale for applying these particular Group and business unit performance indicators in determining the VCC is as follows: sales correlate with market success, EBITA reflects profits, and margins reflect profitability, ASP tracks value add and price discipline, OPEX and FCF represent operational and capital efficiency, respectively. As for the performance indicators linked to the external market, earnings per share is important to shareholders and for the determination of the share price. Group and business unit financial performance objectives are generally weighted at 75% of the overall VCC.
In line with our strategy and to reflect Sonovaʼs corporate social responsibility and sustainable business approach, business relevant ESG targets are formally reflected in the VCC based on IntACT, our ESG strategy outlined in Sonova’s corporate responsibility report. IntACT operates in four key areas: serving society, advancing our people, acting with integrity, and protecting the planet. ESG performance objectives represent 10% of the overall VCC: 5% allocated for two objectives consistent for all Management Board members and 5% for one to three individual objectives each.
The individual performance component is based on the achievement of individual objectives defined at the beginning of the financial year between the CEO and individual members of the Management Board – and, for the CEO, between the Board of Directors and the CEO. The total weight of the three to eight individual performance objectives for each member of the Management Board is generally 15% of the overall VCC. The weight can be increased up to 35% for exceptional reasons, such as supporting key strategic initiatives, including research and development.
Long-term equity incentive award (Executive Equity Award Plan)
The purpose of the EEAP is to ensure long-term value creation for the company, alignment of the interests between shareholders and the members of the Management Board, and the long-term retention of talent at Sonova.
The EEAP is offered annually to the members of the Management Board. The Board of Directors determines the individual grant level to the members of the Management Board based on the recommendation of the CEO, and to the CEO based on the recommendation of the NCC. Generally, the grant date is on February 1 each year.
Under the EEAP, the CEO receives an equity compensation mix of 62.5% in options and 37.5% in PSUs and the other members of the Management Board are awarded 50% in options and 50% in PSUs.
A portion of the EEAP is allocated in the form of performance options. This reflects the growth-focused strategy and the desire to further strengthen the alignment of the Management Board compensation with our shareholder interests.
Options granted under the EEAP vest in four equal annual instalments over a period of 16–52 months, depending on ROCE achievement. The first tranche vests on June 1 of the year following the grant year (16 months after grant date). The exercise price of the options is the closing price of the Sonova share on the Swiss Stock Exchange (SIX Swiss Exchange) at the grant date, and the life of the options is 10 years.
The fair value of the options is calculated at the grant date by a third party using the “Enhanced American Pricing Model.” Additional information is available in Note 7.4 to the consolidated financial statements. Re-pricing of any out-of-the-money options granted under the EEAP is prohibited.
For reference, the average vesting period of the options is 34 months. Options are typically exercised approximately one and a half years after their respective vesting date. In this way options align management with shareholder interests, as value creation is only realized in the event of increasing share price (see section 6 for more information on the overall levels of the target achievements as well as other qualitative comments).
The vesting of the option granted in the 2021/22 financial year to members of the Management Board is based on ROCE as performance criterion because this metric reflects multiple KPIs, including both the profitability of the company and the efficiency with which Sonovaʼs capital is being employed. The Board of Directors generally determines the target level of performance at which the options will vest in full and a minimum performance threshold below which there is no vesting. Payout levels on ROCE performance between the threshold and the target are determined by linear interpolation. There is no provision for over-achievement; the proportion of options that can vest ranges from 0% to 100%. The ROCE target is ambitious and represents a multiple of the weighted average cost of capital. The ambition is to continuously improve ROCE over time, in line with strategic planning.
Starting with the options granted in February 2020, and to further foster long-term alignment with shareholder interests, options are subject to a five-year restriction period from the grant date. During this period, even after the vesting date, options cannot be exercised, sold, pledged, assigned, transferred or otherwise disposed of.
Performance Share Units
The other portion of the EEAP is allocated in the form of PSUs.
PSUs are subject to a cliff-vesting of three years and four months, depending on the relative Total Shareholder Return (rTSR) achievement. This external criterion is measured against a peer group of relevant companies and thus incentivizes the Management Board to outperform the peers. Sonovaʼs TSR is measured against the SLI®1) constituents that remain in the index during a performance period of three years and two months from the grant. A performance period slightly shorter than the vesting period provides for sufficient time to measure the performance achievement and receive approval of the calculation prior to vesting. The SLI® was selected in order to compare Sonova´s performance to other Swiss listed companies with a comparable complexity and geographic footprint, providing a relevant and challenging benchmark for Sonovaʼs value creation.
Depending on the rTSR performance ranking, the vesting schedule of PSUs is as follows:
- 20th percentile or below: no cliff vesting occurs and granted PSUs are forfeited (threshold)
- 50th percentile: 100% of granted PSUs vest (target)
- 80th percentile or above: 200% of granted PSUs vest (cap)
- Linear interpolation between the threshold, target and cap
As an additional performance alignment measure, if Sonovaʼs (absolute) TSR is negative over the performance period, the vesting is capped at 100%.
The calculation of rTSR target achievement will be conducted using the average closing price for three calendar months prior to grant and end of performance period, respectively.
The fair value of the PSUs is calculated at the grant date by a third party by using the “Monte Carlo Pricing Model.” Additional information is available in Note 7.4 to the consolidated financial statements.
As with the options, and to further foster long-term alignment with shareholder interests, PSU grants from February 2020 onwards are subject to a five-year restriction period from the grant date. During this period, even after the vesting date, PSUs and underlying shares cannot be sold, pledged, assigned, transferred or otherwise disposed of.
- The Swiss Leader Index (SLI) includes the 30 largest and most liquid securities in the Swiss equity market.
Summary of the EEAP instruments
Termination of employment under the long-term equity incentive award (Executive Equity Award Plan)
In the event of termination of employment, unvested awards (PSUs, options, and outstanding RSUs from previous programs) are forfeited. Any applicable restriction period for grants from 2020 onwards continues to apply, unless specifically provided otherwise below. Vested options can be exercised within a period of three months.
Disclosure of targets
Internal individual and/or financial targets under the VCC and the EEAP plans are generally considered sensitive information with the exception of the information relating to rTSR for PSUs. Disclosing internal targets would allow insight into our confidential strategic goals and thereby create a competitive disadvantage for Sonova. Therefore, after another review and careful consideration during the reporting year, the decision was made not to disclose the specifics of the VCC and EEAP internal targets at the time of their setting, but to ensure transparency by disclosing target achievements and their respective payouts at the end of the relevant period.
As a general rule, substantial improvements on a comparable basis against the previous period’s achievements are required in order to meet the growth targets, in line with the companyʼs ambitious strategic and financial plans and as communicated to the capital market.
Sonova Share Ownership Guidelines
To further align the interests of the Management Board with those of our shareholders, the Sonova share ownership guidelines require Management Board members to hold a minimum fixed value in shares equivalent to the following amounts:
- CEO: CHF 1,000,000
- Other members: CHF 200,000
They have three years and five months after receiving the first grant as a Management Board member to build up the shareholding, with a required progression of one year and five months for a 12.5% achievement, and two years and five months for a 25% achievement. Only shares in the form of fully vested shares awarded as part of compensation and, if applicable, share purchases on the open market are counted. Compliance with the shareholding requirement is reviewed annually by the NCC.
As the Management Board is international in its nature, the members participate in the benefit plans available in the country of their employment contract. Benefits consist mainly of retirement, insurance, and healthcare plans that are designed to provide a reasonable level of protection for the employees and their dependents in respect to retirement income, healthcare provision, and coverage against the risk of disability or death.
Sonova maintains defined-contribution plans under the Swiss occupational pension regulations. Pension benefits are provided through the regular pension plan. Members of the Management Board who are under a Swiss employment contract are eligible for the same benefits as all other employees in Switzerland. Members of the Management Board who are under a foreign employment contract receive benefits in line with local current regulatory practice.
The compensation of members of the Management Board who are under Swiss employment is subject to mandatory employer social security contributions (AHV/ALV).
The benefits and company contributions covered by Sonova are disclosed in the compensation report in compliance with Sonovaʼs reporting obligations.
The CEO and selected members of the Management Board are entitled to a flat rate cash car allowance as well as an expense allowance in line with the expense regulations applicable to all members of management in Switzerland, which is approved by the Swiss tax authorities. In an international context, members may also be provided with beneﬁts such as relocation, temporary housing, travel beneﬁts, and tax advice, in line with policies and practices. These other benefits are included in the compensation table at their fair value.
Employment terms and conditions
As part of its commitment to good corporate governance, Sonova has a forfeiture provision in all employment agreements with the Management Board members. It provides for repayment of any compensation paid or granted prior to approval by the AGM if the proposed aggregate compensation of the members of the Management Board is not approved.
All members of the Management Board have permanent employment contracts with a notice period of a maximum of six months. The notice period for the CEO is 12 months. Sonova does not grant contractual severance payments to members of the Management Board, nor does Sonova make advance payments or grant loans to them. There are no change of control provisions other than those highlighted in the EEAP termination provisions. The employment contracts of the members of the Management Board may include non-competition arrangements of a duration of up to 12 months, without any compensation.
Sonova has introduced a claw-back provision allowing the company to reclaim any VCC payment, in part or in full, in the event of an accounting/financial restatement due to non-compliance with financial reporting requirements under the Swiss laws at the time of disclosure. This provision applies to all VCC payments for a period of three years following the financial year related to which the VCC payment has been made.
We believe that the five-year restriction period under the EEAP represents an effective solution to mitigate any impact in the event of an accounting/financial restatement due to non-compliance with financial reporting requirements under the Swiss laws at the time of disclosure.